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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1952-53 TERM
position of the Surrogate's Court, New York County9 was to deny
probate for the instrument; the Appellate Division reversed 0
and the Court of the Appeals reinstated the judgment of the surrogate stating that there had been no publication.
The Court of Appeals in denying the probate bases its finding
upon the fact that the testator had not shown unequivocably to the
witnesses that this instrument was testamentary in character. The
court held that the witnesses had not been told in absolute terms
that the instrument was testamentary and that the acts were not
sufficient to convey the same idea. Acts in themselves may constitute publication. 1 The words and acts used by the testator
("something taken care of in case anything happened to him")
could be taken to mean that he was making an inter vivos gift
or even that he was granting of a power of attorney. This con-2
tention was outweighed by the Appellate Division in its opinion'1
which cited a case where practically the same words were used by
the testator.'
It is the opinion of the writer that the decision of the Appellate Division was more sound in its interpretation of the testimony
of the witnesses than that of the Court of Appeals. The fact that
the instrument is holographic and that the two witnesses must have
understood that they were witnessing a paper of some importance,
in that it did require witnesses, would seem to satisfy the requirement of publication.
Surrogate Court Act § 269
In time of national emergency, the Federal Government is
empowered to enacted legislation under its war power which in
time of peace would be unconstitutional. Such is the Trading with
the Enemy Act.' 4 Under this act the President of the United
States is authorized to "regulate . . . or prohibit, any acquisition,
holding, withholding, use, transfer . . . importation or exportation of. . . any property in which any foreign country or national
thereof has any interest." except. "u-pon such terms and conditions as (he) may prescribe."' 5 The President so ordered, in respect to Hungary, in April of 1940, and he issued Executive Order
No. 8389, and by § 3 of this order the effective date as respect to
9. In re Pulvermacher's Will. 111 N. Y. S. 2d 474 (Surr. Ct 1952).
10. In re Pulvermacher's Will, 280 App. Div. 575, 116 N. Y. S. 2d 110 (1st
Dep't 1952).
11. See note 7 supra.
12. See note 10 supra.

13. In Matter of Palmer's Will, 42 Misc. 469, 87 N. Y. Supp. 249 (Surr. Ct. 1904).
14. 50 U. S. C. A. Appendix.

15. Ibid. § 5 (b).
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Hungarian nationals was March 13, 1941.' Its prime purpose was
to stop uses of foreign property rights that might imperil national
defense."
Under its provisions, any bequest to a Hungarian
national must be deposited in a "blocked account" at a domestic
bank, or with a public officer, agency, or instrumentality designated by a court having jurisdiction of the estate.""
In In re Braier's Estate9 the testatrix bequeathed all her
property to her sister, a resident and national of Hungary, as sole
legatee. The surrogate ordered that the money be deposited by
the executor with the Treasurer of the City of New York for the
account of the legatee and prohibited withdrawals except upon
court order. This action was pursuant to § 269 of the Surrogate's
Court Act which provides that, "Where it shall appear that a
legatee . . . would not have the benefit or use or control of the
money or other property due him, or where other special circumstances make it appear desirable that such payment should be
paid into the Surrogate's Court for the benefit of such legatee."
The Hungarian Consular Section of the Hungarian Legation, appearing as attorney for the legatee, contested such deposit and
desired to have the money placed in a "blocked account" maintained by the Hungarian Consular General in a domestic bank.
Their first objection was that the deposit ordered by the surrozate was in contravention of a treaty provision between Hungary
and the United States. 20 This provision provided that the consular officer of either country could receive, for their own nationals,
distributive shares derived from estates in the process of probate,
"provided he remit any funds so received through the appropriate
agencies of his government to the proper distributee.. " 21 The
court reasoned that by the freezing order of the President there
was an inference that such shares would not reach the distributee
if -paid over to the agent of the Hungarian government, and consenuently thd refusal to pay the money would not be in violation
of the treaty since there was no assurance that the Hungarian
L-overnment could carry out its part of the treaty.
The next contention of the Hungarian Consul was that § 269
was incontravention of the federal power to control commerce
16. 12 U. S. C. A. §95(a).
17. Commission for Polish Relief v. Banca Natlionala a Rumaniei, 288 N. Y. 332.
43 N. E. 2d 345 (1942); see also Alexezeicz -a. General Aniline & Film Corp., 181
Misc. 181, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 713 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
18. Public Circular No. 20, 31 CODE FED. REGs. 8926 (Cum. Supp. 1942), explaining General License 30A, 31 CODE FED. REGS. § 131.30a (Cum. Supp. 1942), issued
under Executive Order No. 8389.
19. 305 N. Y. 148, 111 N. E. 2d 424 (1953).
20. 44 STAT. 2459, Art. XXL
21. Ibid. [italics added].
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with foreign countries, and as such it must fall as unconstitu-

tional.22 But it has been held that each state possesses the power
to control the manner in which property within its own jurisdiction passes by last will and testament.? Along with this power the
state may direct how both the procedure for the probate of the will
and the process of administration is effectuated. 24 Actually the
executive freezing order could be terminated without altering the
conditions for which § 269 was enacted; for there would still be no
guarantee that the distributee would receive the bequest and this
uncertainty would frustrate New York's attempt to safe guard the
testatrix's desires to protect the legatee's property. 5 Furthermore, the court overlooked the possibility of Executive Order No.
8389 which provides that such funds may be in the alternative
deposited "in a blocked account or with a public officer, agency, or
instrumentality designated by a court having jurisdiction of the
estate."126 This could have well been- interpreted as giving the
state courts the express power to direct where the money should

be deposited.

Thus the question of constitutionality might have

been avoided.
Settlement ForAfter-born.Children
The Court of Appeals has finally in a 5 to 2 opinion settled the

question of what constitutes a settlement for an after-born child
not provided for in the last will and testament of his parent. The
holding of In re Faber's Estate7 was that a settlement is dependent upon the intent of the testator and the facts of the individual case. In the instant case the testator left a net estate of
$54,000 in trust for his wife and father with a weekly amount to
be paid to both of them, and in the case that the wife's weekly
amount was not sufficient, then additional amounts of any size
were to be made from the principal. The principal was to go to
the older child upon the death of the testator's father's and wife's
deaths. The only other child, after-born, was the co-beneficiary,
with her sister, of insurance policies which amounted to $14,500
for each child. The executors brought an action to determine if
the amount of insurance policies constituted a settlement for the
after-born child. The court found that they did constitute a settlement.
22. U. S. CoNsr. Art. I, § 8.

23. Mager v. Grima, 8 How. 490 (U. S. 1850) ; see also Rocca v. Thompson, 223
U. S. 317 (1912).

24. Lyeth v. Hoey. 305 U. S. 188 (1938).
25. Matter of Wcidberg, 172 Misc. 524, 15 N. Y. S. 2d 252 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
26. See note 18 supra [italics added].

27. 305 N. Y. 200, 11IN. E. 2d 883 (1953).
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